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LATIN AMERICA'S COMMUNAL RESPONSE TO THE
ENERGY CRISIS: THE LATIN AMERICAN ENERGY
ORGANIZATION (OLADE)

CHRISTOPHER C. JOYNER*

INTRODUCTION
On November 2, 1973, twenty-one nations in the Latin American
community formally signed the Lima Agreement which established the
1
Latin American Energy Organization (Spanish acronym, OLADE). The
legal creation of this new regional organization, while not in direct response, came less than three weeks after the Arab members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC) 2 imposed an embargo
on petroleum exports to the United States and the Netherlands, as well as
substantially reducing petroleum production rates for countries in the
3
European Economic Community and Japan.
Given this extraordinary occurrence and the indicative caprices earmarking international petro-politics, the formulation of OLADE merits
special consideration because of the political implications and economic
potentials held out to its member states. Therefore, the purpose of this
article becomes threefold: First, to analyze the energy situation in Latin
America and by doing so, determine what factors were chiefly responsible
for prompting the need for a region-wide energy organization. Second,
to examine the various provisions comprising the Lima Agreement in
order to gain insight into their realistic viability and chances for success.
And finally, to explore the rationale underlying this multinational accord,
particularly those aspects favoring further Latin American integration,
those fostering greater permanent sovereignty over indigenous energy
resources, and those prorting more progressive socio-economic development throughout the region.
*Former Director, Center for Peace and Environmental Studies, Florida State
University; Ph.D. Candidate, Woodrow Wilson School of Government and Foreign
Affairs, University of Virginia.

The author would like to express his appreciation to the Organization of
American States' Columbus Memorial Library; the OAS Department of External
Affairs; and to Sr. Emesto Cuesta of the U.N. Economic Commission for Latin
America for their advice and assistance in the preparation of this article.
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FACT'ORS LEADING TO A LATIN AMERICAN
ENERGY AGREEMENT
As might be anticipated, the general energy consumption pattern
found in most of Latin America reveals moderately rapid industrial development, but set in predominantly agricultural, rural, spacially-diffused
societies. The consumption of commercial energy fuels (viz., petroleum
and petroleum products, natural gas, hydroelectric power, coal, geothermal
energy, and nuclear energy) is relegated primarily to urban centers and,
in national economies, to modernization programs. Non-commercial fuels
(viz., wood, charcoal, sugar bagasse, sawdust, and other industrial residues)
are concentrated mainly in rural households and the more traditional,
slower developing areas. 4 (See Appendix, Tables A-1 and A-2).
As presently characterizing all industrializing countries, hydrocarbon
fuels - diefly petroleum and natural gas - furnish the bulk of energy
needs. For Latin America, nearly 64% of the region's commercial energy
is supplied by petroleum, while 17% is attributed to increased use of
natural gas. 5 However, overall consumption of commercial energy in Latin
America is unequally distributed, with four nations possessing threequarters of the regional total: Mexico utilizes 24%, Brazil 23%, Argentina
16%, and Venezuela 10%.6 Furthermore, projected indications suggest
this disparate situation is unlikely to change within the next decade.
Despite these disturbing realizations, greater industrialization and
socio-economic betterment can only be achieved with increased availability
of energy fuels, the most important of which is petroleum. But for the
overwhelming majority of people in Latin America, the petroleum picture
is anything but bright.
Although petroleum production in Latin America has increased at
a steady rate, its position relative to the world scene has noticeably
deteriorated. Between 1960 and 1970 crude oil production in Latin
America rose from 228.2 million cubic metres to 304.8 million cubic
metres, signifying an annual growth rate of 3.3 percent. 7 Nevertheless,
while perhaps superficially impressive, this growth index lags far behind
the world average of 8.2 percent, and mirrors Latin America's depreciating
role in world crude production - down from 18% output in 1960 to
barely 12% in 1970.9
Regarding future crude oil assets in Latin America, during the period
1960-1970 proven reserves dropped from 3800 to 3600 million cubic
metres. 9 Admittedly, by 1972 new discoveries considerably boosted reserve
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holdings in Ecuador, Bolivia, Brazil, and Mexico.10 Even so, these gains
have been appreciatively offset for the region as a whole by accompanying
reserve declines in Venezuela, Peru, Colombia, and Argentina.1 (See
Appendix, Table A-3).
At the same time proven reserves have been falling, consumption of
hydrocarbon fuels in Latin America has pursued a fluctuating upward
trend, and currently respresents more than 80 percent of all commercial
energy demands.1 2 Coincident with this, three noteworthy observations
about Latin America's general growth patterns of petroleum demand
should be posited:
1. The average per capita consumption of petroleum and its derivative products is relatively high, evidencing an annual increase of 4%
compared to the world average of 3.5%.
2. There exist wide inter-country inequities for per capita petroleum
consumption and its proportionate contribution to the total schema of
energy usage.
3. In major crude exporting countries, bunkers (i.e., oil transporting tankers) and consumption in oil fields and refineries account for
high proportions of total energy demand." Thus, the energy consumption
pattern varies greatly from one Latin American nation to another, and
in the primary oil producer countries, the petroleum sector itself moves
into the forefront of governmental attention. 4
Also, on the national level a distinction must be drawn between those
countries which can barely satisfy their own needs (or must resort to
petroleum imports to meet demand) and those which are self-sufficient
in petroleum resources and remain traditional exporters. Such a comparative overview of present and future production capabilities vis-A-vis
consumption demands is provided in Table I below.
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Table 1
Latin America: Forecast of Crude Oil Production
and Consumption 1975-1980
(Million Cubic Metres)
1975
Country

Argentina
Bolivia
Brazil
Colombia
Chile
Ecuador
Mexico
Paraguay
Peru
Trinidad
and Tobago
Uruguay
Venezuela
Others
Total

Production

Consumption

1980
Balance

Production

Consumption

Balance

30.0
3.6
16.0
15.0
2.5
15.0
36.0
5.0

34.0
0.9
40.0
8.0
7.8
2.3
37.0
0.4
8.0

4.0
+ 2.7
- 24.0
+ 7.0
5.3
+ 12.7
1.0
0.4
3.0

40.0
5.0
25.0
20.0
2.5
25.0
45.0
7.0

44.5
1.2
55.0
10.5
10.0
3.2
48.0
0.6
10.5

4.5
+ 3.8
- 30.0
+ 9.5
7.5
+ 21.8
3.0
0.6
3.5

10.00
240.0
.2
373.3

2.5
2.6
11.0
16.0
170.5

+ 7.5
2.6
+229.0
- 15.8
±202.8

12.0
270.0
.02
451.7

3.7
3.4
14.0
20.0
224.6

+ 8.3
3.4
+256.0
- 19.8
+227.1

Source: ECLA, on the basis of official data; The Petroleum Economist
(January, 1974).
Table I plainly reveals that Brazil, Mexico, Argentina, and Venezuela
are the principal crude oil consumers in Latin America, subsequently followed by Colombia, Peru, and Chile. Nearly 80% of regional demand
for hydrocarbon fuels emanates from the first four countries; if the latter
three are added, the resultant total represents over 90% of Latin America's
entire petroleum usage.' 5 Significant also is the realization that this
trend will persist throughout the 197 0 's.
Interestingly enough, the aggregate surplus of crude oil production
for all Latin American consumers - more than 200 million cubic metres is grossly misleading. When Venezuela is excluded from the production
totals, a truer picture of Latin America's energy situation emerges: given
today's tendencies, by 1975 there will be a production-consumption deficit
approximately 26.2 million cubic metres of crude; persistent to 1980,
this deficit will have risen to nearly 29 million cubic metres.
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Presumably then, Latin America's status as a regional exporter in
the world energy market depends heavily on Venezuela's production
capability. However, in recent years Venezuela's share in world petroleum
production has markedly dwindled, despite sizeable export increases to
the United States.' 6 This decline is attributed to rapid acceleration of
crude production in the Middle East and North Africa, which climbed
from 27% of the world total in 1961 to 44% by 1970.17
Venczuela's portion of Latin America's crude oil output has diminished
74% of the region's total in 1961 to 71% in 1972 - due
as well -from
to heightened production rates fixed by Ecuador, Mexico, and Argentina?
Notwithstanding this, Venezuela still contributes more than 60% of Latin
America's crude oil production increases, nine-tenth's of regional crude
exports, and about seven-tenth's of exported refined petroleum products?19
The only other noteworthy exporters of crude in Latin America are
Colombia, 20 Trinidad and Tobago, Bolivia, and Ecuador (since 1972).
Latin America's refining capacity on the whole rose 4.6% annually
during the 1960's, 21 but three-fourth's of the region's refineries are located
in only four countries: Venezuela possesses 34% of Latin America's
refinery operations, while Mexico maintains 14%, Brazil 12%, and
Argentina 11%.22 Yet, prior to the 1973 Arab embargo, refinery expansion in Venezuela - which had more than doubled between 1955 and
1965 - practically had become stagnant. Similarly, Colombia and Trinidad and Tobago evinced spurts of refinery growth during the 1960's,
but lately they have ceased to make any telling improvements. 3
One crucial problem confronting the large majority of Latin American
countries is the immediate need to satisfy energy demands through imports. Certainly, crude oil is usually cheaper to import than its derivatives,
but the advantages and feasibility of this procedure remain contingent
upon the requisite volume and structure of consumption found in each
country. Accordingly, a definite and rapid tendency -towards replacing
imported petroleum products with crude oil has become typical in many
Latin American countries. Not surprisingly, therefore, in the past decade
refined imports have decreased constantly while crude imports have risen
dramatically from 27 million cubic metres in 1971 to 60 million cubic
metres in 1970. 24 This replacement process has been patently evident in
Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, Central America, and Jamaica. Mexico, however,
is the notable exception, allowing imports of refined petroleum products
since 1961 to grow nearly six-fold. 25 This "luxurious practice" has been
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permitted principally by Mexico's progressive expansion of domestic production and refinery operations to counterbalance swelling local demands
for crude.
In contrast, Brazil is by far Latin America's greatest net importer of
petroleum. During 1970 more than 18.7 million cubic metres of crude
were imported by Brazil. 26 These petroleum imports, almost double
Brazil's own production of 9.5 million cubic metres, comprised 44 percent
of the region's entire inventory of crude imports and 27 percent of its
imported refined products. 27 Perhaps more alarming than this, Brazil's
import bill for petroleum products soared from $249 million in 1961 to
$330 million in 1970,28 and the pattern remains unbroken today. Last
29
year Brazil paid out a staggering $2.1 billion for petroleum imports.
Brazil, which in 1972 imported an average of 376,000 barrels of crude
per day (b/d), is not alone by any means regarding import dependency.
The most recent figures available -those
from 1972- indicate that
Chile imported 70,500 b/d, Argentina 45,000 b/d, Uruguay 42,000 b/d,
Peru 35,000 b/d, and Mexico 35,000 b/d. 30 Understandably, Latin
America's importing nations are very anxious not to lose out in the present
world scramble for available supplies of petroleum. Conversely, the region's
exporters are equally anxious to reap the fullest benefits accrued from
heightened energy demands coincident with skyrocketing petroleum prices.
The upshot of these developments finds both Latin America's exporters
and importers quite cognizant of the paramount need to protect their
national economic interests in a rapidly changing world petroleum market
place. Yet, the seriousness of the situation becomes fully apparent when
the devastating financial impacts upon inter-regional trade programs are
realized.
The severe difficulties in meeting balance-of-trade payments, greatly
exacerbated by tremendous price escalations for petroleum commodities
during the past year, 3' could portend catastrophic economic repercussions
for every energy-importing country in Latin America. To demonstrate
this, the current magnitude and severity of the regional balance-of-payments situation is presented in Table 2.
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To pay solely for petroleum imports, Latin America as an economic
entity had to dole out more than 23% of its 1974 export revenues. In the
individual case of Brazil the figure is an astounding 34.5%.
Obviously, expenditures for petroleum purchases (as a proportion
of export revenues) differ remarkably throughout the region. For example,
petroleum imports for Barbados are estimated to be higher than 64% of
its exports' value in 1974, compared to only 24.5% in 1973. Other Latin
American countries experiencing the same financial burden have reported
representative 1974 and 1973 percentages of their export revenues for
payment of petroleum imports as follows: the Dominican Republic, 51
versus 18.7%; Uruguay, 39.5 versus 14.5%; Jamaica, 35.1 versus 12.8%;
and Brazil, 34.5 versus 12.6%. Three non-petroleum exporting countries
in Latin America appear less affected by the recent surge in petroleum
prices. Mexico paid out only 2.5% of export revenues in 1974, whereas
a year earlier the amount was 0.9%. Likewise, statistics from Argentina
and Costa Rica indicate significantly lighter financial pressures from
petroleum imports upon their national economies.
Even so, predictions of petroleum costs are calculated to exceed 25%
of every Latin American state's monetary reserves this year, with the
single exception being Mexico (4.9%). Generally, petroleum import costs
vis-a-vis monetary reserves is most pronounced in the countries of Central
America, the Caribbean area, and Uruguay. Thus, While the Dominican
Republic's 1974 petroleum import bill will claim an incredible 413.3% of
its 1973 monetary reserves, the relative projections for Central America
vary from 115.8% in Honduras to 31.1% in Guatemala; for the Carib.
bean, from 99.6% in Jamaica to 53.1% in Haiti; and for Uruguay, the
estimation has been put at 64.1%.
The probability that the net petroleum importing countries of Latin
America will reduce their purchases abroad in the foreseeable future,
is for all intents and purposes, nil. In the first place, 68% of all energy
32
regionally consumed is derived from petroleum crude; in the second place,
33
supplied by imports
are
demands
45% of all Latin America's petroleum
with eleven countries importing more than 95% of their hydrocarbon
needs.34 As a result, this exaggerated dependence upon petroleum, coupled
with a dearth of technological and economic resources for developing new
alternative energy sources, suggests that any substantial reduction in
consumption levels could possibly generate a concomitant contraction in
many national economies, and consequently produce an economic climate
conducive to continental recession.
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On the other hand, four countries in the Latin American family
presently enjoy declared petroleum-exporter status: Venezuela, Ecuador,
Trinidad and Tobago, and Bolivia."
Table 3
Petroleum Exports by Net Exporting Countries of Latin America, 1972
and Estimates for 1973 and 1974

Venezuela
Volume
(millions of barrels)
Value
(millions of US$) a
Ecuador
Volume
(millions of barrels)
Value
(millions of US$)
Trinidad and Tobago
Volume
(millions of barrels) b
(millions of US$)
Bolivia
Volume
(millions of barrels)
Value
(millions of US$)
Total
Volume
(millions of barrels)
Value
(millions of US$)
Average price per barrel

1972

1973

1974

1,121.0

1,143.2

1,166.9

2,875.0

4,012.6

11,200.0

24.9

59.9

66.1

59.9

276.5

51.7
124.1

Increase (%)
1974
1974
1972
1973

389.6

279.1

595.0

993.3

215.2

56.9
191.1

60.0
540.0

435.1

282.6

10.9

12.2

13.2

31.7

40.4

121.0

381.7

299.5

1,208.5

1,272.2

1,306.2

3,090.7
2,557.0

4,520.6
3,553.0

12,456.0
9.563.0

403.0
372.9

276.0
268.4

aActual sales price.
bNational production.

Source: OAS official data.

As depicted in Table 3, petroleum revenues of these four net exporters
will increase, according to estimates by the Organization of American
States, from $4.5 billion in 1973 to $12.5 billion in 1974. Concurrently,
the cost of petroleum imports to Latin American countries will jump from
$1.4 billion in 1973 to $3.8 billion in 1974, or a rise greater than 250%.36
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In short, this debilitating encroachment upon the payments situation
for most Latin American countries- aggravated by recent price developments - will, in great likelihood, disrupt many national development
programs. Payment deficits will become more outstanding; production
costs in industry will increase sharply due to accelerating energy costs
and less availability of vital non-petroleum imports; and, deficit countries
might be forced to reorder their development priorities by favoring more
export-oriented industries to encourage a more satisfactory balance-of37
trade.
To recapitulate, several troubling manifestations in Latin America's
present energy situation have demonstrated the urgent need for an interAmerican energy organization to establish policies and priorities:
1. Despite the increasing per capita indices in consumption rates,
production of hydrocarbon energy sources has been unable to keep pace
with demand.
2. Accelerated crude oil production has signalled a decline in total
proven reserves within the region.
3. Latin America's consumption, production, and refining of petroleum and its derivatives are unevenly concentrated geographically among
a handful of countries hence making access to hydrocarbon imports more
difficult for less fortunate governments.
4. Latin America's regional "surplus" of crude oil production is
actually a statistical mirage. When Venezuela's participation is omitted,
regional production estimates reveal sharp deficiencies in the foreseeable
years ahead.
5. Only four countries in Latin America are net exporters of
petroleum. All others must, in differing degrees, rely upon imports to
satisfy their energy demands.
6. The phenomenal price increases for imported crude have precipitated an impending financial crisis for almost all Latin American
economies. Whereas the few oil-endowed are now acquiring great revenues,
the many oil-deprived are concurrently suffering huge deficits in their
balance-of-trade payments.
7. Finally, should present-day financial trends continue unabated,
economic development and industrial priorities in Latin America will
likely be compromised for a shift toward export industries to accommodate
mounting trade deficits. Such a turn of events surely would pose an indefinite delay for socio-economic progress throughout the region.
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Realizing these grave implications for Latin America's energy situation, the governments in the region sought each other's advice and counsel.
Plans were initiated, negotiations undertaken, compromises made, and
preliminary studies conducted. The immediate solution came in the form
of a new regional body - the Latin American Energy Organization
(OLADE).
FUNCTIONS AND STRUCTURE OF OLADE
The birth of OLADE evidences a surprisingly short gestation period.
After the First Latin American Informal Meeting of the Consultation of
Ministers of Energy and Petroleum (held in Caracas, August 21-24, 1972),
proposals were made openly for forming a continent-wide energy organization. In April 1973, during the Second Latin American Meeting of the
Consultation of Ministers of Energy and Petroleum in Quito, it was decided to recommend to all governments in the region creation of OLADE. 3s
Less than seven months later the Lima Agreement was formally presented,
signed, and submitted for ratification to the respective national legisla5 9
tures.
As enunciated in the Lima Agreement, OLADE embodies an organization dedicated to "cooperation, coordination, and advisory service," guided
by its central purpose to encourage the "integration, protection, conservation, rational use, marketing, and defense of energy resources of the
' 40
region.
Moreover, fifteen objectives and functions are enumerated as cardinal
goals undergirding OLADE's politico-economic existence. In summarized
form, these are:
1. To promote unified action for utilizing and protecting the region's
energy resources and to defend ("individually or collectively") against
any "actions, sanctions, and coercion" which might impede the advancement of a member state's socio-economic development plans;
2. To further the independent development of energy resources
and capabilities;
3. To formulate rational policies for exploring, exploiting, processing,
and marketing energy resources;
4. To engender the conservation of all energy resources;
5. To foster inter-American negotiations for stabilizing those energy
supplies fundamental to each member state's "own integral development;"

LAWYER

OF THE AMERICAS

6. To expedite the industrialization of energy resources and the
expansion of energy-producing industries;
7. To encourage the implementation of "energy programs of common interests;"
8. To provide a forum contributing to the "understanding and
cooperation among member states," especially concerning the appropriate
uses of energy resources;
9. To promote the creation of a financial organization to subsidize
energy-related programs;
10. To assist landlocked countries acquire free transit privileges of
energy resources across member states territories;
11. To advance development of a sea, river, and land transportation
network, hence facilitating transnational access to energy resources;
12. To advocate formation of a Latin American energy market
which would proffer recommendations for fair pricing policies conducive
to progress in national energy sectors;
13. To exhort prudential regulation of national energy policies as
an incentive for regional integration;
14. To promote technical cooperation and the exchange and dissemination of scientific, legal, and contractual data among member
states; and
15. To urge adoption of effective measures for preventing environmental pollution, particularly that resulting from "exploitation, transporta41
tion, storage, and use of energy resources" in the region.
In order to achieve these broad functional objectives, three main
organs were designed as OLADE's structural components: the Meeting of
Ministers; the Board of Experts; and the Permanent Secretariat.
The Meeting of Ministers, composed of the national secretaries overseeing energy matters in each member state, is the supreme decision-making
authority in the organization. 42 This body is designated to formulate
general policies and to issue directives deemed essential for accomplishing
the aforementioned purposive goals.4 3 Furthermore, the Meeting of Ministers is responsible for ultimately approving OLADE's budget, annual
energy report, and financial statements, as well as regulating the by-laws
and selecting the organization's chief executive officials." These substantive
functions are augmented by the Meeting of the Ministers' chartered power
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to appropriately consider any recommendations and reports submitted by
the Board of Experts or the Permanent Secretariat. 45 On procedural questions, the Meeting of Ministers is obligated to designate convention sites
46
and schedule assembly dates for OLADE's biannual sessions.
Respective to parliamentary procedures, each member state is allotted
one vote in the Meeting of Ministers.47 For a quorum to be declared, twothird's of the member states' representatives must be present, 4 and
curiously, all decisions within this body are adopted by only a one-third
49
affirmative count of the delegates voting.
The Board of Experts, entrusted with no voting power, operates
essentially as a preparatory committee for the Meeting of Ministers.
Made up of delegates sent by member countries, this organ is expected
to convene twice a year and serves OLADE primarily in an advisory
capacity.5 0 That is, the Board of Experts submits the proposed agenda
and tentative work programs to the Meeting of Ministers, in addition
to conducting detailed studies and drafting reports on energy activities
51
in Latin America.
Finally, the Permanent Secretariat, as defined in the Lima Agreement, is the "executive" organ of OLADE.5 2 Directed by the Executive
Secretary, 1 this body has the responsibility for transmitting reports and
relevant documents from member states to the Board of Experts for critical
analysis and review. 54 Integral duties assumed by the Permanent Secretariat
entail drafting the working agenda and proposed energy programs for
the Board of Experts; 55 preparing and submitting to the Meeting of the
Ministers (after study and approval by the Board of Experts) OLADE's
budget, its annual report, an energy "balance sheet," and a financial statement- 6 and supervising studies pertinent to energy resources, particularly
hydrocarbons, with especial emphasis on detecting possible implications
7
for socio-economic conditions in member states.5
No less important are the information-gathering duties assigned to
the Permanent Secretariat staff. Chief among these are maintaining updated inventories of member countries' energy requirements, resources,
regulations, and localized program priorities ;58 appointing informed groups
and expert panels to analyze more efficacious means for activating state
energy plans; 59 and compiling all data relevant to furthering OLADE's
60
regional purposes.
Thus, OLADE's functional machinery embodies a legal institution
specifically charged with improving inter-American governmental and
technical cooperation in energy matters. The region's instrument for
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activating corrective energy action has been shaped and organized, but
subsequent responsibility belongs to the member states for interpreting
objectives of the organization, determining necessary policies, and providing the means for operationalizing designated programs. To accomplish
genuine transnational cooperation, OLADE must be able to discern continental priorities and make appropriate policy decisions. Our analysis
now turns to these pressing policy needs.
TOWARDS A REGIONAL ENERGY
DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY
Although there were many exclamations of "regional solidarity" and
"hemispheric brotherhood" after the Lima Agreement was promulgated,
the greatest challenges foi OLADE lie in the immediate months ahead.
In this regard, five areas of exigency will have to be acted upon effectively
if Latin America's dire energy situation is to be ameliorated. First, in the
current era of spiraling global inflation, energy costs and prices- particularly those of hydrocarbon fuels-must be re-evaluated in light of
each country's financial ability to pay; second, secure and adequate energy
supplies must be assured for every OLADE member to foster industrial
development and socio-economic progress; third, member states' energy
research and development programs must be emphasized and expanded not only in perfecting new energy sources, but also in optimizing production efficiency of those sources presently being utilized; fourth, OLADE
must enact legislative sanctions on a national basis for preserving human
health and safeguarding the national environment from energy pollutants;
finally, implicit in all of the above is some sacrifice of sovereign national
interests, especially by petroleum exporters, for the good of the entire
regional community.
During the interim months since OLADE's formation, some corporation officials have speculated whether this new regional body might be
the incipient step towards a continental regime to strictly regulate indigenous resource exploitation by foreign commercial interests. Respective
to energy producing activities, OLADE conceivably could exercise two
primary responsibilities: first, OLADE might become a legal conduit for
standardizing and protecting negotiated contract terms for joint energy
ventures with foreign companies (such as those recently concluded in
Bolivia, Ecuador, and Peru); and second, if a "guest" multinational exploiting company were to seriously threaten or economically jeopardize
a Latin American host country, OLADE's concerted response could bring
down heavy retaliatory pressure against the offender.
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Notwithstanding these possible interventionary roles for OLADE, it
should be realized that within the last decade Latin American countries
increasingly have acquired permanent sovereignty over their indigenous
hydrocarbon resources.61 This is clearly evidenced by the evolution of
state petroleum enterprises which are endowed with extensive regulatory
powers, possess considerable decision-making autonomy, and operate in
nearly every phase of indigenous petroleum extraction. As a result, in
1965 the prominence attached to public ownership of national petroleum
operations eventuated into a separate petroleum organization, the Latin
American State Petroleum Enterprises Mutual Aid Association (Spanish
acronym, ARPEL) 62
Even so, prior to OLADE's inception, ARPEL's activities were restricted mainly to conducting petroleum surveys and to serving as a forum
for oil company discussions about common problems. In short, weak
political support, coupled with a lack of financial resources, precluded
ARPEL from assuming a more positive regional role in energy matters,
Now, however, OLADE appears to be generating new life and purpose
through the ARPEL group. Two weeks after the Lima document was
signed, ARPEL agreed to advocate establishing a Latin American energy
common market.61 This indeed was significant progress toward achieving
one of OLADE's cardinal goals, namely inauguration of a fair system in
the region for setting uniform crude oil prices, which in the past had
4
been fixed by arbitrary, unilateral criteria.
Redressing the unequal balance in the cost for petroleum imports
will be an overriding objective for OLADE members. Yet, despite the
inclusion of both Latin American importers and exporters in the organization's membership, securing import price controls will pose a most
difficult task.
One feasible alternative for exerting regional influence over hydrocarbon imports' price-cost structure- which OLADE should consideris promoting competition and diversification among local energy producers.
Competition carries a strong incentive for reducing costs, whether through
facilitating technological advancement or achieving greater efficiency
in production and marketing procedures. Similarly, further industrial
diversification could foster more competition by proliferating the amount
of available energy sources, as well as the number of competing energy
suppliers. Diversification of energy-producing industries throughout Latin
America, therefore, should be a crucial ingredient in OLADE's policies
if regional energy supplies are to be maintained in sufficient quantities
for member countries.
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In addition, through a competitive regional market structure both
OLADE's producer and consumer members' interests would be enhanced
substantially. Energy reserves would be kept available relative to the
pervasive economic conditions of supply and demand. OLADE concurrently
must strive to prohibit petroleum producing countries or their State
companies from obtaining a dominant, monopolistic position over hydrocarbon prices. Pursuant to the latter aim, regionwide legislation should be
designed and activated to discourage any undesirable aggrandizement of
market power by particular industrial groups or national governments.
A creative suggestion now receiving wide circulation concerns orginating a financial scheme to re-cycle accumulated surplus funds from regional
petroleum exporters back to deficit importers.6 5 Should such a plan prove
feasible in Latin America, presumably Venezuela (and to a far lesser
extent Bolivia, Ecuador, and Trinidad and Tobago) would remit a specified
portion of their windfall revenues to other Latin American nations. This
inter-American aid might be funnelled through a regional intermediary
(logically OLADE's Permanent Secretariat) or sent directly to needy
importers. 6 Regardless of the manner executed, a re-distribution type
of energy assistance for Latin America would take on a significance transcending conventional notions of "foreign aid," in addition to underscoring the region's ability to effectuate meaningful economic integration.
In today's quest for modernization, certain prominent expectations
largely have determined the overall economic policy for every developing
nation. Foremost among these are sustaining steady industrialization;
insuring consumer price stability; acquiring full employment; and, reaching a favorable balance-of-payments trade status. Petroleum.derived energy
obviously contributes in great part to securing the above mentioned goalvalues for Latin America, especially since the fundamental prerequisite
for any kind of regional economic growth is maintaining sufficient, reliable, and regular provisions of commercial energy.
Hence, OLADE must endeavor to legally insure, within the appropriate
context of each member nation's own economic and social guidelines, that
energy requirements are met in a manner most amenable to the entire
region. On this account, it would be impractical, if not overtly detrimental,
for OLADE to seek the lowest possible import costs or cheapest possible
petroleum prices when their acquisition served to undermine basic socioeconomic goals or individual national security considerations. As a consequence, OLADE will have to undertake studies and make definitive
recommendations in order to reach acceptable policies among these diverse
regional priorities.
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Still another focus for OLADE's immediate attention is couched in
promoting extensive investment opportunities in energy-producing nations.
To illustrate this vital need, recent projections released by the U.N. Economic Commission for Latin America estimate petroleum and natural gas
consumption to be 252 million cubic metres by 1980, whereas only 156
million cubic metres were consumed in 1970.67 The investment capital
required to compensate the present decade's projected acceleration of
hydrocarbon consumption is calculated to be $18,200 million, of which
exploration and research would absorb $10,999 million and refinery expansion a further $3,440 million." Without commensurate investments,
Latin America's fuel demand soon will outstrip its production capability,
and thereby aggravate an already deteriorating energy situation.
Not to be overlooked in scrutinizing OLADE's legal purview is the
furtherance of both national and regional energy research-development
programs. At the same time, however, there must be expedient legislative
measures enacted to protect human health and the natural environment
from energy pollutants. Admittedly, defining the boundaries and concentrations of energy pollution problems are difficult: such issues involving
the interactions of energy and environment cannot be solved merely by
an overemphasis on either energy needs or environmental restoration
alone. Therefore, OLADE's official policy must be sought in Latin
America's special energy requirements and particular ecological circumstances, consonant with specific regional development strategies as perceived by energy-conscious government leaders.

CONCLUSION
OLADE is not the panacea for all Latin America's energy problems,
nor can it anticipate discovering easy, all-encompassing solutions for
potential regional confrontations. Moreover, OLADE cannot expect to
construct a sound financial structure for the region's energy sector solely
by applying daily, piecemeal measures. Imperative energy policies will
have to be hammered out sagaciously against a background perspective of
possible long-term effects, while also taking into account both local energy
and regional economic plans. In other words, the area's energy crisis
cannot be viewed as an isolated phenomenon; its repercussions acutely
affect all aspects of Latin America's industro-economic livelihood. Thus,
near-term priorities must be established carefully so as not to impede declared long-range regional objectives.
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Coincidentally, OLADE's decision-making polity (the Meeting of
Ministers) must retain considerable flexibility. Changes in energy conditions can be-as distressingly demonstrated in the recent pastcapricious and unpredictable, with far-ranging impacts. Hence, OLADE's
energy strategies and specified prescriptions for Latin America's developmental progress should not be so rigid to obscure the inevitable uncertainty characterizing all forecasts and predictive studies. Accordingly,
setting regional standards and spelling out boundaries for OLADE's
supervisory responsibility (in addition to working for their achievement
by incorporating resolute measures and then testing the efficacy of each
measure) must be implemented as a continuous process.
There is much promise for inter-American energy cooperation under
the auspices of OLADE. Opportunities exist for clarifying new means to
institute comprehensive regional energy policies; for analyzing policy
choices between various governmental options; for ferreting out possible
reasons for conflict over energy resources; and for avoiding the spread
of local energy problems to neighboring parts of the region.
Hopefully, the signatory governments of OLADE can steer their
energy programs in an unselfish direction which is conducive to prudential
hydrocarbon utilization, as well as greater economic integration and
symbiotic social action. During the last few months, prospects have improved optimistically for genuine OLADE cooperation along these lines:
Venezuela and Ecuador have begun espousing their open willingness to
69
participate in a redistribution-of-wealth plan for needy importer nations;
perhaps more important, Argentina and Brazil have tacitly settled an
interpretative dispute concerning a provision in the Lima Agreement;70
and OLADE's next convention is scheduled to meet in Buenos Aires during
71
early August, 1974.
In the final analysis, OLADE will provide a convenient forum wherein
member states can exdhange fruitful ideas and pertinent information. But
OLADE's creation represents more than this. It symbolizes the political
ability of national governments to unite in a concerted effort for confronting a common, urgent challenge. Through OLADE's political machinery,
the member governments now have the opportunity to more wisely interpret
the energy crisis by identifying its basic causes, and then formulating
policies aimed at a vigorous regional economy - one which seeks to
improve the existent standard of living for all Latin America's peoples.

LAnPN AMERICAN ENERGY ORGANIZATION

,e toC

I-n'

uq

CqL-

2

S c~g

4

c

l

J-

ONqw
-p

O

m

m

1

655
0, m, =
O

c

-nL t-

o

'0 Lm -

r-

0c

-e-

d. ol

-

rn

C0

m-

ca
X.

I-l

-

cqc

-

-

o

za

Cl-

Lobft

c~m

CD)
cl

t

-,

a

C

mm'tM t
-)C

iC

c))

co

0o

4

o9

C1 m

C

cq
'C'

-

000
4)

-Ed

,
0~~~~~~ , o0

~ ~~ ~0,--- t-0r,,

'0m
IDmc

Cc

c

M(= co
000

3o

Q

4)aC0

P. Iwo at

I'l
1-0

ow
C m
s

C9

M"

en

Mom

2- CC
%0--o

)0.

m)
Sf~

-

SCl l

ICC
C,~~

C,

0
Q~

CO~)

CCldC

0co
co)

COC
CC*
r0

ElO"-0

CJcocd0
-4ma)

ua)

-'a

-

_q0

LAWYER OF THE AMERICAS
ID 0,
-~ -c00C

Ln

01L

Wm

t-~0~r
m
k
,

m~

N

m~

c~

-

0

-

I

l
C', l
-

CD

0'1I
om
C.
-0

t- cl

Czoo(00O4

m

c- Dc

co

"1

oo

0
10
o0

=

0\l

\0,10

r

"

cc

0

d. C> CDt- '
,c CA
-~

'fo0
'iru

c
ly
0l0N

'

F)

n-tU

c n
ol

N*c
l

ll

lC =c

to
C c

o

oo

C14 m

q

L

c
0

n
-

t-

c

m
n m
a

'

t--

C'HJg

oe j -

m

0

.

-,

In 0c co
0,-

C
n

- VV
c

4=
-I0,m

in

j

In c c

'0

010
M

- c

'

c -CJ cot-mC)I
Q

N

f-a

't

10

cq

Q

c

a

oW

I

010
E

0
10

0

000

41c

-0

0r00o41~-

0 p- v1
>1

~

-08

lI

oC~c

0

v0

4

LATIN AMERICAN ENERGY ORGANIZATION

NOTES
lConvenio que Establece la Organizacidn Latinoamericana de Energia (Agreement Establishing the Latin American Energy Organization), done at Lima, Peru,
November 2, 1973. English translation reprinted in 13 Int'l Legal Materials, 376389 (1974). [Hereinafter cited as The Lima Agreement]. The signatory states were:
Argentina; Bolivia; Brazil; Colombia; Costa Rica; Cuba; Ecuador; El Salvador;
Guatemala; Guyana; Honduras; Jamaica; Mexico; Nicaragua; Panama; Paraguay;
Peru; Dominican Republic; Trinidad and Tobago; Uruguay; and Venezuela. Although Chile attended, it did not then sign the document, but is expected to do so
in the near future. Headquarters for OLADE were designated in Quito, Ecuador.
2The Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC) was
formed in 1968, and includes as members Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the United Arab
Emirates, Libya, Egypt, Omona, Iraq, Syria, Qatar, and Bahrain. OAPEC's siste,
cartel, the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), counts in its membership, Abu Dhabi, Algeria, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Lybia, Nigeria, Qatar, Saudi Arabia,
and two Latin American countries, Venezuela and Ecuador. Trinidad and Tobago
has petitioned for OPEC membership, but presently only enjoys observer status.
Peru expects to acquire OPEC membership by 1976. For general histories of OPEC,
see Z. Mikdashi, The Community oj Oil Exporting Countries (1972) and F. Rouhani,
A History of O.P.E.C. (1971).
'The OAPEC oil embargo, which was activated officially on October 17, 1972
by the "Kuwait communiqu6,' came during the Arab-Israeli Yom Kippur War and
was designed to generate pressure from the target nations against Israel. As formally
stated, the OAPEC consortium's prime objective was to compel Israel's withdrawal
from Arab territories captured during the 1967 Six Day War. House Comm. on
Foreign Affairs, The United States Oil Shortage and the Arab-Israeli Conflict,
H.R. Res. 267, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1973).
Within two weeks of the announcement of the reduction policy, the total
cutback in Arab oil exports was over 20 percent of September, 1973 production
levels. By their actions, the Arabs took 4 million barrels of oil per day out of
world commerce, which translated into an equivalent shortfall of nearly 12% of the
total volume of oil moving in world trade. Id.
However, following fruitful peace negotiations between U.S. Secretary of State
Henry Kissinger and Arab.Israeli leaders, the embargo was lifted for all nations
except the Netherlands on March 18, 1974. N.Y. Times, Mar. 19, 1974, at 1, col. 1.
4
Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA), Offprint: Recent Production and Consumption of Energy in Latin America, 4 (November, 1973). [Hereinafter cited as ECLA Offprint].
51d. at 4. See Appendix, Tables A-1 and A-2.

6Id. at 5.
71d. at 7.
8ld.
91d. at 9.
1od.
1tId. By 1970, Latin America's share of proven world petroleum reserves was
only 4 percent, contrasted with 9% in 1961. Moreover, its reserve production ratio
(i.e., the estimated period before reserves were exhausted) was only 21 years, as
compared to the world average of 35 years and the Middle East's average of 67
years. See Table A-3 in Appendix.
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12Economic Commission for Latin America, Energy in Latin America, 15 Economic Bulletin for Latin America, 5 (1971). [Hereinafter cited as Energy in Latin
America].
131d.
14The paramount importance of the petroleum industry to Latin American exporter governments recently was demonstrated by Carlos Andris P6rez's victory in
Venezuela's presidential election. See Venezuela: Strong Government, 8 Latin
America, July 5, 1974, at 205; and Latin America: Oil Conferences. 8 Latin America, May 31, 1974, at 161.
13 Energy in Latin America, supra note 12, at 13.
16 During 1971, Venezuela's production of crude oil declined 4.3%, thereby decreasing the total regional output by 2.4%. This production decrease continued
into 1972, reaching a level of 9.3%. ECLA Offprint, supra note 4, at 7. See also
Venezuela's Oil: Running Dry, Economist, Dec. 23, 1972, at 70.
17For an enlightening discussion of petroleum developments in the Middle
East-North African region since 1971, see Schuler, The International Oil Debacle
Since 1971, Petroleum Intelligence Weekly, Apr. 22, 1974 (Spec. Supp.).
1SECLA Offprint, supra note 4, at 9.
t9Ld., at 9, 11.
2t

Formerly Colombia's second ranking export, crude petroleum has plummeted
from 16% of export values in 1965, to 8% in 1970, and to merely 2% in 1973.
However, Colombia's exports of refined petroleum products have increased, and
considering higher international oil prices, they should still bring in $45 million in
1974. 9 Colombia Today (No. 4, 1974), at 2.
21ECLA Offprint, supra note 4, at 12. Despite this refinery expansion, consumption of petroleum fuel products increased at an average rate of 6.2% during
the same period (from 68 million to 116 million cubic metres).
221d. For a breakdown of each Latin American country's crude petroleum refining capacity from 1961-1970, see Table A-11 in ECLA Offprint Annex, at 51.
23

Energy in Latin America, supra note 12, at 19-20.

24ECLA Offprint, supra note 4, at 11.
25Id. Mexico's imports of refined petroleum products grew from 338,000 cubic
metres in 1961 to 1,940,000 cubic metres in 1970.
261d. at 10.
271d.
281d. Monetary figures cited throughout this article are in United States dollar
equivalents.
29
Organization of American States (Dept. of External Cooperation), The Petroleum Crisis: Financial and Economic Implications for Latin America (unpublished monograph), 15 (Feb. 1974). [Hereinafter cited as OAS Monograph]. Recent
projections for Brazil's 1974 petroleum import bill range as high as $3 billion.
Next Goal is W~orld Power and Brazil is on Its Wiay, 77 U. S. News and World
Report, July 22, 1974, at 62.
30Figures are from Latin American Prospects, 41 The Petroleum Economist,
Jan. 1974, at 25.
31Oil prices were dramatically increased during 1973. In January, 1973, the
posted price for crude was 02.59 per barrel. By December, oil-producing countries
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in the Persian Gulf area had raised their posted prices to $11.65 per barrel of
crude, and Latin American exporters followed suit, led by Venezuela's world record
price of $14.08 per barrel. N. 0. Times Picayune, Dec. 29, 1973, at A-i, col. 6.
Venezuela again boosted its posted price another 35 cents in June, 1974. See The
Organization of American States, Bulletin of International Prices of Basic Products,
SG/Ser. G/39, PB/III.6 (June 1974).
320AS Monograph, supra note 29, at 18.
;31d. Of these regional imports, Venezuela supplies more than 90 percent. See
text at note 19, supra. However, it should be noted that Venezuela's petroleum exports to Central and South America in 1973 fell almost 14 percent to 128,000 b/d.
Petroleum Intelligence Weekly, Apr. 15, 1974, at 9.
34A percentage classification of Latin America's dependency upon net petroleum
imports to meet national demand (in 1971) reveals the following:
Crude Import Dependency
Percentage
Dependency

0-25%
Argentina
Mexico

25.1-50%
Peru

50.1-95%
Brazil
Chile
Ecuador
Panama

95.1-100%
Paraguay
Uruguay
Costa Rica
El Salvador
Guatemala
Honduras
Nicaragua
Barbados
Jamaica
Dominican Republic
Haiti

Source: OAS data.
35Colombia is excluded because of recent declines in petroleum exports. See
note 20, supra.
36OAS Monograph, supra note 29, at 13.
370n a global scale, Robert S. McNamara, President of the World Bank, has
stated that harmful economic repercussions upon poor countries resulting from the
"energy crisis," could conceivably bankrupt the International Development Association. N. Y. Times, Jan. 29, 1974, at C-16, col. 3.
3
8For a discussion of these two earlier conferences, see Carta Injormaci6n, Sieca
No. 145 (Guatemala, Nov. 1973), at 14-19.
39At this writing, only seven signatory states- Ecuador, Peru, Cuba, Bolivia,
Jamaica, Guyana, and Trinidad and Tobago-- have ratified the Lima Agreement.
Latin America: Energy Together, 8 Latin America, June 28, 1974, at 197. Venezuela,
Argentina, and Brazil are expected to ratify before October, 1974.
40The Lima Agreement, supra note 1, art. 2.
411d. art. 3.
42Id. arts. 9, 10.
411d. art. 10(a), (b).
441d. art. 10(d), (e), (f), and (g).
451d. art. 10(h).
461d. art. 10(j).
471d. art. 11.
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48Id. art. 12.
491d. art. 14.
5Old. art. 18(a).

Slid. art. 18(c).
52M. art. 19.
5
3id. art. 20. The Executive Secretary must be a citizen from a member state
and reside in the host country, i.e., Ecuador. As set forth in Article 21, the
"minimum requirements" for the Executive Secretary's post are as follows:

(a) A degree in law, engineering, economics science, administration, or any
other energy-related field granted by an accredited university; and
(b) Experience in energy-related matters; experience in responsible executive
or administrative positions; and knowledge of at least two of the working
languages of the Organization. [i.e., Spanish, English, Portuguese, and
French].
541d. art. 20(d).
551d. art. 20(f).
561d. art. 20(f).
57d. art. 20(h).
58ld. art. 20(i).
591d. art. 20(j).
6Old. art. 20(k).
6t

See generally M. Mughraby, Permanent Sovereignty Over Oil Resources (1966).

2

6 State-owned companies in the Asistencia Reciproca Petrolera Estatal Latinoamerica (ARPEL) include: Argentina's Yacimientos Petroliferos Fiscales (YPF);
Bolivia's Yacimientos Petroliferos Fiscales (YPFB); Brazil's Petr6leo Brasileiero
(PETROBRAS); Colombia's Empresa Combombiana de Petr6leo (ECOPETROL);
Cuba's Empresa Estatal; Mexico's Petr6leos Mexicanos (PEMEX); Peru's Petr6leos
del Per6l (PETROPERU); Uruguay's Administraci6n Nacional de Combustibles,
Alcohol y Portland (ANCAP); and Chile's Empresa Nacional del Petr6leo (ENAP).
ECLA Offprint, supra note 4, at 53.
63Pouring Tattk on Oily Waters, 1 Latin America Economic Report, Nov. 23,
1973, at 19.
641d.
65Although Venezuela's Minister of Mines and Hydrocarbons, Hugo Pirez La
Salvia, emphatically stated that no regulation exists under which a nation must sell
its oil to importing countries at low prices, Venezuela has advocated establishing
a fund for financing investments in the energy sector to distribute revenues back
to the "have not" importing countries. The Petroleum Economist, supra note 30,
at 25. For an introspective evaluation of such a re-cycling scheme, see OAS Monograph, supra note 29, at 21-34.
66Dr. Raoul Prebisch has openly suggested that surplus oil funds should be
recycled directly to developing countries, asserting that:
This would permit relief for the external payments deficit; support the
expansion of their export industries; and as the purchases of developing countries increased, they would buy back the capital goods and other products from
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the industrial countries-thus relieving their payments deficits. Recycling
would then be three-cornered and add to the general level of world prosperity
as contrasted with the present threat of contraction.
OAS Monograph, supra note 29, at 29.
67ECLA Offprint, supra note 4, at 30.
681d. For a detailed analysis of the projected consumption volumes vis-a-vis
requisite investment values, see Energy in Latin America, supra note 12, at 76-83.
69
Latin America: Energy Together, supra note 39, at 197.
701d. The dispute between Brazil and Argentina concerned the necessity of
inserting a "prior consultation" amendment into the Lima Agreement. Although
Argentina adamantly favored such a clause, conclusion of a working agreement with
Brazil on the Great Parana hydroelectric projects conciliated its position. See
River Plate: General Stroessner and Friends, 8 Latin America, June 14, 1974, at
177.
71Latin America: Energy Together, supra note 39, at 197. The August OLADE
meeting comes after at least two reported postponements. Notwithstanding this, the
major topic of debate likely will be the financing fund for energy development
projects.

